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Abstract 
Using the 2003 Tajikistan Living Standard Survey this paper looks at the 
relationship between gender and poverty and show how, by modifying the equal 
sharing assumption of the household resources, we can easily be misled by the 
poverty and gender relationship. This paper also shows how those gender analyses 
which use the female headed household and male headed household dichotomy in 
Tajikistan obscure the gender analysis of poverty due to the heterogeneity of female 
headed household types. 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
According to the ‘Gendered Analysis of the 2003 Tajikistan Living Standard 
Survey (TLSS)’ (Falkingham and Baschieri, 2004), there appears to be few gender 
differentials in poverty in Tajikistan. This is true regardless of the type of poverty: 24 
percent of women and 23 per cent of men live in households ranked in the bottom 
quintile i.e. are living in relative poverty
1; and 64 per cent of women and 63 per cent 
of men live in a household with a per capita consumption less than 2.15$ PPP a day 
i.e. are absolutely poor 
2. Thus, despite the fact that there is evidence that poverty 
varies by age, region, and household size (Falkingham and Klytchnikova, 2004) it 
appears that there is little evidence of a gender difference in the likelihood of being 
poor. This is in large part a function of the fact that poverty is defined at household 
level, and people living in the same household are assumed to enjoy the same 
                                                 
1 Proportion of men and women ranked in the bottom 20 percent of the household distribution of per 
capita household consumption adjusted for regional price differences. 
2 Share of the population living in household with a per capita consumption of less than US$2.15(using 
ECAPOV PPP conversion factor for 2000 inflated to May 2003 prices using CPI). 
  1standard of living. We argue that within the context of Tajikistan this may be 
misleading. 
Both the recent PAU(World Bank 2004) and the Gendered Analysis of the 2003 
TLSS (Falkingham and Baschieri, 2004) adopted the unitary model of the household, 
which assumes that all the resources in the household are pooled and that all members 
share in these pooled resources in equal measure. However, recent research shows 
that in many instances this is not the case (Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman 1994; 
Kanji 2004), and increasing women’s share of cash income in a household increases 
the share of the household budget allocated to food (Garcia 1990; Hoddinott and 
Haddad 1995; Ulph 1988) and reduces the amount allocated to items such as tobacco 
and alcohol.  
Using the 2003 Tajikistan Living Standard Survey this paper looks at the 
relationship between gender and poverty and shows how, by modifying the equal 
sharing assumption of the household resources, a completely different picture of the 
relationship between poverty and gender may be obtained. This paper also 
demonstrates that gender analyses which simply employ a female headed household 
and male headed household dichotomy obscure the gender analysis of poverty due to 
the heterogeneity of female headed household types in Tajikistan. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews previous studies 
which have examined the intra-household allocation of resources; in Section 3 we 
show the extent of poverty amongst women and men, and how this varies according 
to a range of different assumptions regarding the sharing of household resources; 
Section 4 examines the relationship between poverty and gender by looking at men 
and women living in FHH and MHH and illustrates the heterogeneous nature of FHH; 
some concluding thoughts are presented in Section 5.  
 
2. The unitary model of the household, intra-household 
allocation of resources and gender 
Virtually all poverty assessments carried out by the World Bank adopt the 
unitary model of the household in their analyses. The unitary model of the household
3 
envisages the household as a single unit, implying the existence of a single household 
welfare function reflecting the preferences of all its members. However as Chiappori 
                                                 
3 It has also been called the ‘common preferences’ model or the ‘altruism’ model. 
  2et al. (1993) suggest, this is an assumption which is ‘by no means an innocuous 
assumption’ as individual household members are likely to have different preferences. 
Another fundamental assumption of the unitary model of the household is the pooling 
of all household resources, with the result that all members are assumed to enjoy the 
same level of welfare. However, sociological and anthropological studies show that 
this is rarely the case (Bruce and Dwyer, 1988; Evans, 1989; Moore, 1992).  In 
particular, men are found to retain part of their income and ‘spend some of their 
income on goods for their personal consumption’(Haddad et al. 1994). By contrast, 
women are believed to be more likely to purchase goods for children and for general 
household consumption. A study in Kerala in India suggested that a child’s nutritional 
level is positively correlated with the size of mother’s income, whereas there were no 
significant effect with the increase of parental income (Kumar 1977).  
Finally, the unitary model often relies on an assumption that the household is an 
altruist, taking the well being of others into account. This assumption is difficult to 
maintain when the individual who is assumed to be altruistic is also the perpetuator of 
physical violence’ (Haddad et al. 1994:41). As Haddad et al. (1994) notes, 
sociological and cross-cultural ethnographic studies show that wife-beating occurs in 
virtually all societies; Tajikistan is no exception. A study conducted by the 
Association of Women Scientists of Tajikistan in 1999 interviewed some 1,600 
women in Dushanbe, and across the Republic in Kurgan-Tube, Kulyab, Kofarnihon 
and Tusunzade, on their understanding and experience of violence. A broad definition 
of violence was adopted, including physical, psychological and economic violence. 
Overall the study found that two-thirds (67%) of Tajik women were regularly exposed 
to some form of violence within the home (Falkingham, 2000). Given this it appears 
unlikely that the unitary model of the household will reflect the dominant form of 
household behaviour within Tajikistan. 
Chiappori et al. (1993) argue that a better representation of real life may be 
provided by the collective model of the household. They suggest that there are two 
types of collective models, the cooperative and non-cooperative. In the non-
cooperative models ‘individuals within the household not only have differing 
preferences, but act as autonomous sub economies. Each individual controls their own 
income, and purchases commodities subject to an individual (non pooled) income 
constraint’(Haddad et al. 1994:17). In the cooperative model individuals have a 
choice of remaining single or of forming a household. The household decisions are an 
  3outcome of some bargaining process. This model does not assume the pooling of all 
resources, but rather that men and women choose to pool some resources and retain 
sole control over others.  Thus the key issues within the cooperative collective model 
are the extent to which resources are pooled and the relative strength of men and 
women in the bargaining process. 
Studies which have looked at the intra-household allocation of resources have 
largely concentrated on the relationship between the share of the wife’s income and 
the share of expenditure, treating the household as units of both production and 
consumption. Ulph (1988:45) notes ‘a very clear relationship between the share of 
expenditure on commodities and the share of household income accruing to the wife’, 
whereas Braun (1988) founds a positive relationship between the proportion of cereals 
produced under women’s control and household consumption of calories in Gambian 
households. Garcia (1990) founds that higher the women’s income share of the 
household income, the higher is the amount of calories and protein consumption. 
Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), using the Ulph (1988) non-cooperative bargaining 
model of household expenditure and nationally representative data from Ivory Coast , 
show the extent to which a bargaining model of household behaviour could be used to 
explain patterns of expenditure. They show that increasing wives’ share of cash 
income increases the budget share of food, and reduces the budget share of alcohol 
and cigarettes. They support the view that the ‘household are better modelled by 
collective entities in which bargaining occurs among members’(Hoddinott and 
Haddad 1995:94). 
In his 1985 article, Sen (1985) notes that the relative bargaining position 
amongst household members depends on their perceived contribution to the 
household. Under this assumption women are more likely to be placed in a 
disadvantage position as much of their contribution may take form of non-market 
labour, which is less visible than wage employment. In Tajikistan, nearly three-
quarters of economically active women are employed in agriculture (Falkingham and 
Baschieri, 2004, Table 30) where wages are low and payments in-kind frequent, and 
where often the goods that are produced are consumed within the household. Data on 
women’s use of time also reflects a strongly gendered division of labour within the 
household, with Tajik women spending significant amounts of time on household 
tasks on a daily basis (Falkingham and Baschieri, 2004, Table 39). Both of these 
factors suggest that Tajik women’s bargaining position may be low relative to men’s. 
  4Haddad and Kanbur (1990) show that if resources are unequally allocated 
within the household, poverty measures are sensitive to intra-household inequality. 
This suggests that that if the assumption of equal sharing of household resources is 
found not to be valid in Tajikistan, estimates of poverty amongst women and men 
might change dramatically according to the extent of intra-household inequalities. As 
a consequence a gendered analysis of poverty that uses the unitary household 
assumption might provide an entirely wrong picture of the relative levels of poverty 
amongst men and women. 
In this paper we will show how we can be misled by the assumption of a unitary 
household in the analysis of gender differentials in poverty in Tajikistan and 
investigate the changes in poverty levels that result when we move away from the 
equal sharing assumption. The aim of the paper is not to provide incontrovertible 
evidence for the existence of a non-unitary household model in Tajikistan as 
sufficiently disaggregated data on expenditure and income for women and men are 
not available. Rather the aim is simply to highlight the importance from a gender 
perspective of interpreting with caution any analysis of poverty which assumes the 
unitary household. 
 
3. Unitary versus collective household assumption: what 
happens to the gender and poverty relationship? 
 
3.1 Welfare under the unitary and collective household models 
As discussed above, the unitary household model implicitly assumes that all the 
resources in the household are pooled, that all members share equally in these pooled 
resources and, as a result, the welfare of each member is equal to that of the other 
members of the same household.  
The per capita welfare of household members under the unitary model 
assumption,  , is equal to the sum of male income,  , and female income, 
, divided by the total household members (M = total men, F = total women, K = 
total number of children assuming the absence of child labour). 
K F M W , , M y
F y
 
K F M
y y
W
F M
K F M + +
+
= , ,                                                                      (1) 
  5 
Moving away from the assumption of equal sharing, the welfare of different 
individuals within the household will depend on the proportion of income that is 
pooled into the household budget and how it is allocated. Here we assume that all 
pooled income is equally shared, but that unpooled income is retained for that 
member’s exclusive use. Considering,  , the proportion of total male income which 
is pooled into the household budget, and  the proportion of total female income 
which is pooled into the household budget, the welfare of men and women is given 
by:   
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In this model, in the absence of child labour, the level of per capita child welfare 
is dependant on the amount of pooled resources divided by the number of household 
members. 
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This assumes that mothers do not pool their ‘retained’ income with their 
children. However sociological and anthropological studies have suggested that 
‘women generally more likely to purchase goods for children and general household 
consumption’ (Haddad et al. 1994).  An alternative scenario would be to assume that 
women prioritise the welfare of their children and pool all their resources with their 
children. In this case our previously proposed formulae of female welfare (3) and 
children welfare (4) will be substituted by formulae 5 which represent the welfare of 
women and children, where mothers share all their resources with children. 
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In the unitary household assumption   and   are equal to 1 and the welfare 
of each household member is represented by the formula 1. 
m c f c
 
  63.2 Applying the collective model of the household within the TLSS 
Within the TLSS, total household income is comprised of:  
•  Total wage employment 
•  Social assistance 
•  Remittances 
•  Rent obtained from land 
•  Income from farm activities 
•  Income from family business 
•  Income from non-farm enterprise 
•  Imputed income from the consumption of home production and gifts of food 
received. 
Unfortunately most of the information on income within the TLSS is collected 
at the household level and so it is not possible to attribute this directly to any one 
individual within the household. For example, although pension benefits have an 
individually based entitlement the question on pension income was phrased in such a 
way that it is not possible to directly assign this, or any other social assistance benefit, 
to the person with the entitlement. Similarly it is not possible to assign remittances or 
income from household enterprises to any one individual or group of individuals, 
although often is the men that manage these resources. The only source of income that 
can be directly and unequivocally attributed to an individual within the household is 
wage income, both cash and in-kind. Given this it is necessary to modify the formulae 
presented in section 3.1 above and introduce an additional component, household 
income .  H y
The welfare household members under the unitary household assumption can 
now be written as the sum of female income, male income and household income .  H y
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Under the collective household assumption, the welfare of men, women and 
children can then be written as:  
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assuming, for the time-being, that women do not pool all their resources with 
their children. 
 
3.2.1 Poverty and gender under the unitary model of the household 
Table 1 shows levels of absolute poverty amongst men and women by region as 
reported by the recent World Bank Poverty Assessment Update, using per capita 
household consumption adjusted for regional price differences as the welfare indicator 
and an absolute poverty line of US$ 2.15 a day (47.06 Somoni). As noted in 
Falkingham and Baschieri (2004), there appears to be no significant differences 
between men and women in the likelihood of being poor within region. 
 
Table 1: Absolute poverty amongst women and men by region, TLSS 2003. 
  Overall Poverty rate  Poverty rate amongst  Poverty rate amongst 
   women  Men 
  PO  95% CI  PO  95% CI  PO  95% CI 
GBAO 84.1  80.0-88.3 84.3 79.9-88.6  84.0  79.6-88.2 
Sugd 64.3  60.0-68.6  65.0  60.8-69.2  63.6  59.1-68.2 
Khatlon 78.1  74.3-82.0  78.1  73.9-82.3 78.1 74.3-81.8 
Dushanbe 48.9  42.5-55.5  49.3  43.2-55.5  48.5  41.3-55.7 
RRS 45.1  39.8-50.4  45.5  40.1-50.8  44.7  39.4-50.1 
            
Total 63.4  61.1-65.9  63.9  61.5-66.3  63.1  60.6-65.5 
Source: TLSS 2003.  
Note: Using per capita household consumption and $2.15 PPP poverty line. 
CI are calculated using weighted data, applying the simple weighting factor rather than the grossing up 
weight supplied in the dataset as the latter will disproportionately reduce the standard errors. 
 
Average per capita household income is approximately half that of per capita 
expenditure and this is fairly consistent across household types (see Table 20, 
Falkingham and Baschieri, 2004). This suggests that income is consistently under-
reported by around 50 percent.  Thus for the purpose of this illustrative exercise it 
seems appropriate to an absolute poverty line of $1.08 PPP a day rather than 
$2.15PPP. This gives a poverty line of 23.62 Somoni. 
 
  8Table 2: Absolute poverty amongst women and men using per capita 
consumption expenditure and per capita income, $1.08 PPP a day poverty line.  
  Consumption Income 
  Poverty rate  Poverty rate  Poverty rate  Poverty rate 
  Amongst women  Amongst men  Amongst women  Amongst men 
  PO  95% CI  PO  95% CI  PO  95% CI  PO  95% CI 
GBAO  35.6 27.2-44.1 36.2 27.8-44.6 73.0 66.6-79.3  73.4  67.3-79.4 
Sugd  16.1  12.8-19.4 15.4 12.1-18.6 69.7 65.2-74.3  67.8  63.4-72.2 
Khatlon  27.7 23.3-32.1 26.9 22.2-31.6 66.3 60.9-71.6  65.5  60.0-70.8 
Dushanbe  11.6 8.5-14.7 12.3 8.6-16.1 68.0  60.5-75.5 70.5 63.6-77.4 
RRS  8.5 5.2-11.8 8.4 5.2-11.6  60.0  54.6-65.1 59.5  54.6-64.4 
             
Total  18.3 16.3-20.3 17.8 15.7-19.8 66.3 63.6-68.9  65.5  62.8-68-1 
Source: TLSS 2003. 
Note: CI here, and in the following tables, are calculated using weighted data, applying the simple 
weighting factor rather than the grossing up weight supplied in the dataset as the latter will 
disproportionately reduce the standard errors. 
 
Table 2 shows levels of absolute poverty using two alternative measures of 
welfare - per capita household consumption and per capita income, both adjusted for 
regional price differences - with a poverty line of 23.62 Somoni. Although there are 
marked differences in the level of poverty according to which measure of welfare is 
used, there appear to be no gender differences within region with either measure. 
There are, however, fewer regional differences using income as opposed to 
consumption. This suggests that there may be regional differences in the 
underreporting of income, with unreported income being reflected in consumption 
patterns but not total income; certainly there are likely to be regional differences in 
the opportunities for earning non-cash and secondary incomes. 
 
3.2.2 Poverty and gender under the collective model of the household 
Under the collective model of the household, income is no longer equally 
pooled and shared amongst all members of the household. The critical assumptions in 
determining the welfare of different members of the household are now the proportion 
of income pooled by men i.e.  , and the proportion of income pooled by women i.e. 
. As a first step we assume that both men and women decide to retain 50% of their 
wage income and pool 50%. If there is equality between men and women in the 
regional labour market, then we might expect   and  to be similar (if not the 
same) and thus for the welfare of men and women to also be similar.  Table 3, 
however, reveals a very different picture. 
m c
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household models, using income and $1.08 PPP a day poverty line 
 
  Unitary household:  =1,  =1  f c m c Collective  household  =0.5,  =0.5  f c m c
  Poverty rate Poverty rate Poverty rate Poverty rate Poverty rate  Poverty rate
  amongst   amongst amongst Amongst amongst men  amongst 
  women men  children women   children
  PO  PO PO  95% CI PO 95% CI PO 95% CI PO  95% CI  PO 95% CI
GBAO 72.3  65.9-78.6  71.3  65.3-77.3 75.8 69.4-82.1 75.7 69.8-81.7 66.6  60.4-72.7 83.3 76.7-89.8
Sugd 68.2  63.8-72.6 66.4  61.9-71.0 71.1 66.5-75.6 71.3 67.3-75.2 56.6  51.6-61.7 81.4 77.5-85.2
Khatlon 62.8  57.3-71.7 64.0  58.4-69.6 68.8 63.5-74.1 64.0 58.7-69.3 50.8  44.5-57.2 77.7 72.8-82.6
Dushanbe 63.9  56.5-71.4 66.2  58.0-74.3 75.5 68.6-82.1 67.0 60.7-73.3 52.7  45.6-59.8 88.6 84.8-92.3
RRS 57.7  52.2-63.3 56.7  51.4-61.9 63.1 58.2-68.1 59.4 53.4-65.5 47.4  41.7-52.9 68.0 63.1-72.9
              
Total 63.9  61.2-66.6 63.5  60.8-66.3 68.9 66.2-71.6 66.1 63.5-68.7 52.7  49.7-55.7 77.6 75.7-80.0
Source: TLSS 2003. 
 
Moving from the unitary household to collective household model results in an 
increase in absolute poverty rates amongst women and children, and a fall amongst 
men. The changes in the welfare position of men and women are sufficiently large to 
result in a statistically significant gender gap. Under the unitary model, and using per 
capita household income as the welfare measure, around 64 percent of both men and 
women are absolutely poor; under the collective model, 66 percent of women are 
defined as poor compared to 53 percent of men. These gender differentials directly 
reflect the differentials in wage income between men and women in the household, 
which in turn reflect the gendered division of labour within the household, with 
women being more likely to engaged in unpaid family work. 
The assumption of individuals only pooling half their wage income is a strong 
one. In reality in an agricultural society like Tajikistan, where extended families with 
large numbers of children are the norm, it is unlikely that men or women would want, 
or be able, to retain as much as half their wage income for their own purposes. A 
more realist scenario is presented in Table 4 which assumes   = 0.8 and  = 0.8, i.e. 
women and men retain one-fifth their wage income and pool four-fifths. Under this 
stronger pooling scenario the gender poverty gap is reduced from 13 percentage 
points to 7 percentage points. By pooling a greater share of their income men 
experience a heightened risk of poverty, whilst women experience a slight fall. The 
greatest gainers, however, are children with poverty rates falling from 78 percent, 
under the moderate pooling assumption in Table 3, to 72 percent, under the stronger 
pooling assumption in Table 4). 
f c m c
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model (strong pooling assumption), using income and $1.08 PPP a day poverty 
line. 
  Collective household,   =0.8,  =0.8  f c m c
  Poverty rate  Poverty rate  Poverty rate 
  Amongst women  amongst men  amongst children 
  PO 95%  CI PO 95%  CI PO 95%  CI 
GBAO  73.4  66.9-79.8 69.4  63.4-75.3 77.7  71.3-84.3 
Sugd  69.5  65.4-73.5 61.5  56.5-66.4 75.1  70.7-79.4 
Khatlon  62.7  57.3-68.3 57.7  51.8-63.5 72.1  66.6-77.5 
Dushanbe  63.9  56.9-71.0 59.2  51.2-67.2 80.6  75.2-86.1 
RRS  58.7  53.1-64.4 51.7  46.6-56.8 64.6  59.6-69.6 
           
Total  64.6  61.9-67.2 58.1  55.3-60.9 72.1  69.4-74.7 
          Source: TLSS 2003. 
 
So far we have assumed that women do not share their ‘retained’ resources with 
their children.  Thus in Table 4, children, with ‘access’ only to communal household 
resources, experience much higher rates of poverty than their mothers or fathers.  
However, as noted above, this is unlikely to be the case, and women and children’s 
welfare may be better represented as being: 
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Applying this alternative allocation assumption results in the gender and 
poverty gap between men and women widening, with 66 per cent of women and 71 
per cent of children having a per capita income below the poverty line compared to 58 
per cent of men (see Table 5).  
Table 5: Absolute poverty by gender according to the collective household 
model (strong male and female pooling assumption, female and child sharing), 
using income and $1.08 PPP a day poverty line. 
  Collective household   =0.8,  =0.8  f c m c
  Poverty rate  Poverty rate Poverty  rate 
  Amongst women   amongst men  amongst children 
  PO  PO  PO  95% CI  PO  95% CI 
GBAO 73.6  67.2-79.9  69.4 63.4-75.3  76.9 70.4-83.5 
Sugd 71.3  67.3-75.2  61.5 56.5-66.4  74.1 69.8-78.4 
Khatlon 65.6  60.0-71.1  57.7 51.8-63.5  71.4 65.8-76.9 
Dushanbe 65.5  58.4-72.6 59.2 51.2-67.2  78.7 72.7-84.8 
RRS 59.1  53.5-64.8  51.7 46.6-56.8  64.4 59.469.5 
          
Total 66.3  63.6-68.9  58.1  55.3-60.9  71.3  68.6-74.0 
                            Source: TLSS 2003. 
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A final scenario is presented in Table 6 which assumes   = 1 and  = 0.8, i.e. 
women put all their income into the shared household pot and men retain one-fifth 
their wage income and pool four-fifths.  By women pooling all their income, the 
poverty rate amongst women and children increases slightly as all women’s resources 
are now shared with both their children and their menfolk. Moreover poverty amongst 
males is reduced yet further, with the result that the poverty gender gap is just under 
ten percentage points. It is worth noting that it is assumed that all the other household 
income except wage income is equally shared by the household members. This is a 
strong assumption as in reality men rather than women may be managing these 
resources. Thus the stimulation presented in Table 6 represents only a relatively small 
step away from the unitary household assumption and probably represents an 
underestimate of actual gender differentials in welfare in Tajikistan. 
f c m c
 
Table 6: Absolute poverty by gender according to the collective household model 
(strong male pooling assumption, total female pooling), using income and $1.08 
PPP a day poverty line. 
  Collective household   =1  =0.8  f c m c
  Poverty rate  Poverty rate Poverty  rate 
  Amongst women   amongst men  amongst children 
  PO  PO  PO  95% CI  PO  95% CI 
GBAO 73.9  67.6-80.2  69.0  62.8-75.2 77.2  70.7-83.6 
Sugd 71.8  67.9-75.7  60.8  55.8-65.7  74.4  70.0-78.6 
Khatlon 65.8  60.2-71.3  56.6  50.8-62.4  71.4 65.9-76.9 
Dushanbe 66.5 59.5-73.6  58.2  49.9-66.5  79.1  73.1-85.1 
RRS 59.4  53.7-65.1  51.5  46.4-56.6  64.6  59.6-69.6 
            
Total 66.7  64.1-69.3  57.4  54.6-60.2  71.5  68.8-74.2 
          Source: TLSS 2003. 
 
 
Taking this last scenario of the collective household, Table 7 shows poverty 
levels by region and urban and rural residence using both the unitary and collective 
models. This provides a clear illustration of the sensitivity of estimates of welfare by 
gender to assumptions regarding the allocation of resources within the household. As 
is the case with poverty defined using expenditure in the main World Bank PAU, 
there are no marked gender differences in poverty under the unitary household model 
although there are significant differences within gender across regions. Under the 
collective household assumption, however significant poverty differentials by gender 
  12emerge. The gender gap is least marked in GBAO (5-6 percentage points) and most 
marked in Sugd and Khatlon. The gap is generally higher in urban areas, where wage
income constitutes a larger share of total household income, with poverty rates 
amongst women in urban Khatlon being nearly 16 percentage points higher than
amongst men (78% v 62%). 
 
 
 
able 7: Absolute poverty amongst men, women and using both unitary and 
Unitary household: =1,  =1 Collective  household  =1  =0.8 
T
collective household model by oblast and urban and rural residence, using 
income and $1.08 PPP a day poverty line. 
 
    f c m c f c m c
  Poverty rate  vert Po y r Povert ate y rate Poverty rate Poverty r e  Povert at y rate
  amongst   amongst amongst Amongst amongst men  amongst 
URBA  women men children women  children
  PO PO I P I PO I P I   PO    95% C 95% C 95% C PO  95% CI O 95% C
GBAO 61.7 8.4 61.4  -76.6 62.7 7.1 65.4 0.9  59.4    45.1-7 46.3 48.2-7 49.9-8 42.5-76.6 65 8.9 .5 52.1-7
Sugd  59. 4    72   66.3 2-73. 65.5 58.0-72.9 .9 65.1-80.7 69.4 62.2-76.5 57.7  49.1-66.3 76.6 69.4-83.9
Khatlo 73.3 67.5-79.3  75.4  70.7-80.1 79.7 73.0-86.4 78.0 71.1-84.9 62.4 53.5-71.2 83.7 76.7-90.6
Dusha 63.9 56.5-71.5  66.2  57.9-74.4 75.5 68.8-82.2 66.5 59.4-73.6 58.2 49.8-66.6 79.1 73.0-85.1
RRS 66.4  53.0-79.6  66.8  54.9-78.8 70.7 54.3-87.3 69.2 58.1-80.3  61.8  51.2-72.5 74.6 60.7-88.4
          
Total 66.7  62.8-70.7  67.7  63.6-71.7 75.1 71.1-79.1 69.9 66.1-73.7  59.3  54.7-63.8 78.8 75.1-82.6
RURA          
          
GBAO 74 67.7 1.2  73 66.7-79.7 77.8 70.5-84.2 75.6 68.8-82.5  70 64.4 7.4 78.6 71.5-85.6 .5  -8 .3  .9  -7
Sugd 69 63.5 4.5  66 61.1-72.6 70.5 64.9-76.1 72.9 68.2-77.6  61 55.9 7.9 73.5 68.4-78.8 .0  -7 .8  .9  -6
Khatlo 60.4 53.9-66.8  61.6 55.1-68.3 66.5 60.4-72.7 63.0 56.6-69.4 55.5 48.6-62.2 68.9 62.6-75.2
RRS 56.5  50.4-62.5  55.3  49.7-60.9 61.9 56.8-67.1 57.0 51.6-64.1  50.1  44.6-55.6 63.1 57.9-68.4
          
Total 62.7  59.4-66.1  62.1  58.7-65.5 75.1 71.0-79.1 65.4 62.1-68.6  56.7  53.3-60.2 78.8 75.1-82.6
 Source: T 2003.
 by age under the two different scenarios are shown in Table 8. 
Empl
 
L S  S  
 
overty rates P
oying the collective model, the poverty gender gap is greatest amongst those 
aged 25-29 when 67 percent of women are poor compared to 50 percent of men – a
differential of 17 percentage points. Gender differences are least marked amongst 
those aged 60 and over, but nevertheless there remains a gap of over 5 percentage 
points.
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Table 8: Absolute poverty amongst men, women and children using both 
unitary and collective household model by age group, using income and $1.08 
PPP a day poverty line. 
 
  Unitary household:  =1,  =1  f c m c Collective  household  =1  =0.8  f c m c
  Poverty rate Poverty rate Poverty rate Poverty rate  Poverty rate Poverty rate
  amongst amongst amongst Amongst   amongst men amongst 
AGE  women men children women   children
  PO  PO PO  95% CI PO 95% CI PO 95% CI  PO  95% CI PO 95% CI
          
Below 16  none    none  68.9 66.2-71.6 non none    71.5 68.8-74.2
16-19 65.5  61.8-69.2  63.6  59.7-67.4 none 67.4 63.9-71.0  58.9  55.2-62.7 none
20-24 63.1  59.1-67.1  63.4  59.7-66.9 none 66.1 62.3-69.9  58.6  54.9-62.2 none
25-29 63.7  59.7-67.6  58.1  53.7-62.5 none 67.2 63.3-71.1  51.9  47.3-56.6 none
30-39 68.1  64.7-71.4  67.9  64.6-71.3 none 70.7 67.5-74.0  59.4  55.6-63.1 none
40-49 65  61.6-68.4  67.6  64.1-70.9 none 67.6 64.4-70.7  59.7  56.1-63.5 none
50-54 56.5  51.6-61.4  56.5  51.0-62.0 none 60.4 55.5-65.3  50.0  44.5-55.6 none
55-59 59.4  51.7-67.1  60.6  53.8-67.5 none 62.5 54.9-70.1  56.4  49.6-63.3 none
60+ 59.3  54.9-63.6  60.6  56.4-64.8 none 61.9 57.6-66.3  56.5  52.2-60.8 none
          
Total 63.9  61.2-66.6  63.6  60.8-66.3 68.9 66.2-71.6 66.7 64.1-69.3  57.4- 54.6-60.2 71.5 68.8-74.2
Source: TLSS 2003. 
 
 
4.  Investigating the poverty of Female and Male Headed 
Households  
 
Due to lack of nationally representative information on intra-household resource 
allocation, gendered poverty analyses have often focused on the gender of the 
household head. However, recent studies have questioned the suitability of such a 
simple dichotomy to highlight the gender gap in poverty.  Using the unitary model of 
the household, Falkingham and Baschieri (2004) report that there appear to be no 
significant differences in the level of poverty between individuals living either in 
female headed or male headed households Tajikistan.  
 
Table 9: Absolute poverty between men and women living in FHH or 
MHH, using income and $1.08 PPP a day poverty line. 
 
 Unitary  household  assumption  Poverty rate  Poverty rate  Poverty rate 
   amongst women   Amongst men  amongst children 
   PO  95% CI  PO  95% CI  PO  95% CI 
MHH   64.6  61.6-67.5  63.4 60.5-66.3 69.3 66.4-72.2 
FHH   61.2  57.2-65.2  65.1 60.2-69.8 66.5 62.2-70.9 
 Source: TLSS 2003. 
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In order to unpack this further it is useful to develop a typology of female-
headed households based on their age (i.e. whether they are aged under 60 years of 
age or over 60) and their household composition. Overall, 39 percent of female 
household heads are aged 60 and over and the majority of these live in extended 
households. Single pensioner households make up just 5 percent of all rural FHH and 
11 percent of urban FHH. The majority of FHH are headed by younger women and 
most FHH contain children. Table 10 shows the distribution of FHH by type within 
urban and rural areas. 
 
Table 10: Distribution of Female Headed Households by type within urban and 
rural areas, TLSS 2003  
Type of  female headed households  Urban Rural All  FHH 
Single pensioner  11.3  5.4  8.5 
60+ living with other adults only  5.6  4.0  4.9 
60+ living in extended household with kids  13.8  38.9  25.8 
Single younger adult  8.2  -  4.4 
Lone parent  15.6  8.1  12.0 
Under 60 living with other adults only  15.8  6.4  11.3 
Under 60 living in extended household with kids  29.6  36.8  33.1 
Total 100%  100%  100% 
 Source: TLSS 2003  
 
Of course, the fact that a household is headed by a female does not mean that 
there are no males living in it. Indeed many FHH containing children will contain a 
male child, but they may also contain male adults too. Table 11 below shows the 
share of women, children and men within each type of FHH. Overall women 
constitute a greater share of FHH than men (38.2% v 22.3%) but it is notable that over 
a fifth of the members of FHH are adult males. This rises to nearly two-fifths amongst 
FHH headed by a woman under 60 living with other adults only. 
 
Table 11: Proportion of males, females and children within MHH and FHH, by 
types of FHH. 
 
   Proportion 
of female  
Proportion of 
children 
Proportion of 
male 
MHH   28.4  41.6  30 
FHH   38.2  39.5  22.3 
 Single  pensioner  100  0  0 
  60+ living with other adults only  65.4  0  34.5 
  60+ living in extended household with kids  35.6  42.4  22.3 
  single younger adults  100  0  0 
  15 Lone  parent  31.5  68.5  0 
  Under 60 living with other adults only  59.1  0  40.1 
  Under 60 living in extended household with kids  33.6  41.6  24.7 
        
Total   29.8  41.3  28.8 
 
 Source: TLSS 2003. 
 
 
Tables 12 and 13 show estimates of headcount poverty amongst individuals 
living in different household types. Interestingly even when the unitary model of the 
household is employed, males living in MHH have a slightly lower likelihood of 
living in poverty than women or children living in MHH. This may reflect a 
compositional effect, as single male households are the household type least likely to 
be poor. There are no differentials in poverty according to gender within FHH (Table 
12).  
 
Table 12: Absolute poverty for men and women living in a MHH and FHH 
by types under the unitary household model, using income and $1.08 PPP a day 
poverty line. 
 
Unitary household   Poverty rate  Poverty rate  Poverty rate 
f c =1,  =1  m c amongst women  amongst men  amongst 
children 
     PO 95%  CI PO 95%  CI 
All MHH  64.6  61.6-67.5  63.4 60.5-66.3 69.3 66.4-72.2 
All FHH  61.2  57.2-65.2  65.1 60.2-69.8 66.5 62.2-70.9 
Single pensioner  42.7  31.7-54.2  n.a   n.a  n.a  n.a 
60+ living with other adults only  42.6  23.8-61.4  44.3 20.9-67.8  n.a  n.a 
60+ living in extended household with kids  65.3  58.4-72.1  67.2 59.5-74.9 65.9 58.4-73.5 
single younger adults  43.1  26.4-59.8  n.a n.a  n.a  n.a 
Lone parent  58.7  49.6-67.9  n.a n.a  58.6  47.8-69.4 
Under 60 living with other adults only  44.2  31.4-56.9  44.7 30.9-58.5  n.a  n.a 
Under 60 living in extended household with kids  67.1  60.6-73.5  69.6 62.8-76.2 69.6 63.2-76.1 
          
Total 63.9  61.2-66.6  63.5 60.8-66.3 68.9 66.2-71.6 
Source: TLSS 2003. 
 
However, when the analysis is repeated using the collective household model, 
there are marked gender inequalities even within FHHs (Table 13). A priori one might 
expect gender differentials to be most marked in those household types where adult 
males comprise the larger share, i.e. female head aged under 60 living with other 
adults. However this is not the case. Rather they are higher within extended 
  16households headed by a women aged 60 and over containing younger family 
members. The presence of children means that younger women within the household 
are less likely to be in waged employment, and so even a small shift away from the 
assumption of the unitary household results in a widening of the poverty gender-gap. 
 
Table 13: Absolute poverty for men and women living in a MHH and FHH 
by types under the collective household model, using income and $1.08 PPP a 
day poverty line.  
 
Unitary household   Poverty rate  Poverty rate  Poverty rate 
f c =1, =0.8  m c amongst women  Amongst men  amongst children 
     PO PO  PO  95%  CI 
MHH 67.5  64.6-70.3  57.3 54.4-60.2  71.9  69.1-74.8 
FHH 63.7  59.9-67.4  58.2 52.9-63.4  68.9  64.7-73.1 
Single pensioner  42.7  31.7-54.2  n.a n.a  n.a  n.a 
60+ living with other adults only  42.6  23.8-61.4  44.4 20.9-67.8  n.a  n.a 
60+ living in extended household with kids  68.9  62.2-75.5  57.7 49.1-66.3  69.2  61.7-76.7 
single younger adults  43.1  26.4-59.8  n.a n.a  n.a  n.a 
Lone parent  58.7  49.6-67.9  n.a n.a 58.6  47.8-69.4 
Under 60 living with other adults only  45.7  33.1-58.5  41.3 27.3-55.3  n.a  n.a 
Under 60 living in extended household with kids  69.7  63.4-75.9  63.4 56.5-70.3  71.8  65.5-78.3 
           
Total 66.7  64.1-69.3  57.4 54.6-60.3  71.5  68.8-74.2 
Source: TLSS 2003. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored the impact of varying assumptions concerning the intra-
household allocation of resources upon estimates of absolute amongst men women 
and children in Tajikistan. There is little evidence available to guide the choice of 
assumptions concerning the extent of income pooling within Tajikistan. Thus a range 
of scenarios are presented. Moving away from the unitary model of the household, 
where resources are shared equally amongst household members and each member of 
the household is assumed to enjoy the same level of welfare, has profound 
implications for any analysis of poverty by gender. Significant gender differentials 
result even if relatively moderate assumptions concerning male control over resources 
are employed. If men are assumed to retain just 20 percent of their wage income for 
their own use and all other sources of income, including social assistance benefits, 
remittances and the imputed value of consumption of home production, are equally 
  17shared, on average women experience a headcount income poverty rate of ten 
percentage points higher than men. Children are the most disadvantaged, with poverty 
rates 14 percentage points higher than adult males.  Although the true extent of gender 
differentials within Tajikistan remains uncertain, the message is clear; by utilising the 
unitary model of household allocation we are in danger of underestimating significant 
differences in the welfare of men and women. 
The paper also serves to illustrate the limitations of using the gender of the 
household head as an indicator of gender differentials in any analysis of poverty. 
Caution needs to be exercised on two fronts. First female-headed households are 
heterogeneous in nature. Treating such households as a homogeneous group is not 
appropriate; individuals living in some types are much less likely to be poor than on 
average and others face a significantly heightened risk of being poor. Second, simply 
using FHH does not circumvent the problems inherent in applying the unitary 
household model.  If we are serious about ‘gendering development’ then it is 
important that the evidence base used for policy making is gender sensitive. We 
would argue that the traditional approach to measuring poverty employed in a 
standard poverty assessment fails on this count. For future poverty analysis to be more 
meaningful and reflexive of the reality of women’s lives it is essential that the ‘black 
box of the household’ is unpacked. 
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